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Some Notes on "Reliance"
C. Robert Morris*
Courts often argue that a legal result is necessary to satisfy
a party's reliance or vindicate its expectations. Courts justify
their conclusions by stating that it would be unjust to disap-
point or thwart a perceived expectation or reliance.
I intend to analyze some of these arguments that I believe
are flawed. They rarely offer any insight concerning the issue
at hand; and usually they are circular - they assume reliance
because they perceive that the result is just and assume the ac-
tor who is expecting justice has the same perception. I will il-
lustrate my point with examples from various branches of the
law, selecting them in no systematic manner and reflecting ar-
eas I have studied over the years.
LOGICAL DIFFICULTIES - CORPORATE CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS
I begin my analysis of reliance with cases concerning the
integrity of corporate capital. We can examine this body of law
dispassionately because it is no longer significant. Modern cor-
poration statutes do not contain capital requirements because
the requirements proved unworkable, failing to protect corpo-
rations' creditors.1
The American law concerning corporate capital began with
Wood v. Dummer,2 in which Justice Story recaptured an insol-
vent bank's liquidating dividends for its creditors. Stating that
"the capital stock of banks is to be deemed a pledge or trust
fund for the payment of the debts contracted by the bank,"3 he
ordered defendant stockholders to return a portion of their div-
idends to the complaining creditors.4 Subsequent cases, relying
on the "trust fund" idea, forbade stockholders to set-off the un-
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. See Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 6.21 and the annota-
tions thereto, 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr. ANN. § 6.21 (Supp. 1990).
2. 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944).
3. I& at 436 (emphasis added).
4. Id- at 440. For a more detailed description of Wood, see Morris, Book
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paid balance of a stock subscription against debts the company
owed them5 and held stockholders who subscribed for shares at
a discount liable for the difference between what they had paid
and the par value of their shares. 6
Justice Mitchell of the Minnesota Supreme Court did not
think highly of the "trust fund" theory. In Hospes v. North-
western Mfg. & Car Co., 7 he denounced it as "not sufficiently
precise or accurate to constitute a safe foundation upon which
to build a system of legal rules."'8 He held that shareholders
should be liable to creditors for the unpaid balance of the par
value of their shares, even though the corporation had released
them from this obligation,9 but he sought to put that liability
on a sounder basis - the business community's reliance upon
corporate capital.10 Moreover, this basis would comport with
the general rule that those creditors who had advanced credit
before the flawed stock issue or with knowledge of the flaw
could not recover.1 1 He reasoned:
The capital of a corporation is the basis of its credit .... People deal
with it and give it credit on the faith of it. They have a right to as-
sume that it has paid-in capital to the amount which it represents it-
self as having;, and if they give it credit on the faith of that
representation, and if the representation is false... the law, upon the
plainest principles of common justice, says to the delinquent stock-
holder, "Make that representation good by paying for your stock." ...
It is the misrepresentation of fact in stating the amount of capital...
that is the true basis of the liability of the stockholder in such cases;
and it follows that it is only those creditors who have relied, or who
can fairly be presumed to have relied, upon the professed amount of
capital, in whose favor the law will recognize and enforce an equity
against the holders of "bonus" stock.12
Arguments from reliance are usually based on an arm-
Review, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1035, 1036-43 (1977) (reviewing B. MANNING, A CON-
CISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPrrAL (1977)).
5. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610, 622 (1873). In Sawyer,
a shareholder who had given his note in payment for the stock of an insurance
company bankrupted by the Chicago fire was not permitted to set off a claim
against the company on a policy it had issued on a house destroyed in that fire.
Id-
6. See, e.g., Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 47 (1875) (stockholder who
had been promised he need only pay 20% of the par value of the shares to
which he subscribed held liable for the remaining 80% in the company's ensu-
ing bankruptcy).
7. 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117 (1892).
8. Id- at 192, 50 N.W. at 1119.
9. Id at 197, 50 N.W. at 1121.
10. Id at 198, 50 N.W. at 1121.
11. See id at 196-97, 50 N.W. at 1120-21 and cases cited therein.
12. Id at 197, 50 N.W. at 1121.
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chair' hunch. Certainly Justice Mitchell's was. He cited no evi-
dence concerning the creditors' attitudes. Rather, he took judi-
cial notice of those attitudes as he supposed them to be. It is, of
course, difficult for us almost a century later to know how ac-
curate he was. It may have been that irregularities in the issu-
ance of stock were so common that many, or even most,
creditors expected them and did not actually rely on represen-
tations of corporate capital.
Another problem with arguments from reliance arises
when determining whose reliance shall be paramount. We can
expect that adversaries have contrary hopes or fears. The com-
mon stockholders in Hospes expected to enjoy their status as
common stockholders gratis.13 Justice Mitchell states that the
stockholders had "[a] desire to get something without paying
for it,"'14 but he makes no further mention of this matter. Un-
doubtedly, he considered the stockholders' ambitions unworthy.
The clash between incompatible expectations can be better
illustrated by a recurring conflict between stockholders and
creditors in which the equities are more in balance. In a recent
bankruptcy case,' 5 a corporation's two stockholders had a fall-
ing out and resolved their difficulties when one sold his stock
to the corporation for its $1.4 million note, secured by a security
interest in all the company's assets.' 6 After assuming this new
burden, the corporation remained solvent and made monthly
payments on the note for over three years, at which time it be-
came insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.17 The bankruptcy
court ruled that the ex-stockholder's claim was unenforceable
and that the security interest was void.'8 Again, the court rea-
soned from the "trust fund" theory:
[S]hareholders have a special relationship with the corporation differ-
ent from other creditors of the corporation. Thus, they assume the
risk when agreeing to accept payment at a subsequent time for the ex-
change of their stock, that the corporation will remain solvent and en-
joy future profitability from which their debt will be satisfied. This
was aptly reasoned in the In re Fechheimer Fishel Company case
wherein the court stated that a stockholder who accepts a note for the
redemption of his stock "sells at his peril and assumes the risk of con-
summation of the transaction without encroachment upon the funds
which belong to the corporation in trust for the payment of its
13. Id at 191, 50 N.W. at 1119.
14. Id
15. In re Northwest Oxygen, Inc., 99 Bankr. 703 (Bankr. M:D.N.C. 1989).
16. Id at 704.
17. Id.




If the court focuses on the expectations of the creditors,
however, it will reach the opposite conclusion. On similar facts,
another court held that the filing of the security interests put
subsequent creditors on notice that the company's assets were
encumbered.20 The court reasoned that because the creditors
were expecting those assets to be devoted to paying the secured
debt in preference to themselves, the ex-stockholder could pre-
vail.21 These cases illustrate that when the parties have con-
flicting expectations, it is important which set of expectations
the court honors, because that choice determines the outcome.
That choice, of course, depends on other factors often unarticu-
lated and known only to the judges themselves.
But, there is a further difficulty. Though expectations can
be thought to determine the law, the law can also be thought to
shape expectations. Those subsequent creditors, even if they
were aware of the ex-stockholder's security interest, might
have concluded it was void on "trust fund" grounds, and there-
fore they would still expect to be paid. For instance, Delaware
neither adopted the "trust fund" theory nor followed the Hos-
pes case.22 Instead, it construed its corporation statute as re-
quiring shareholders who subscribed to stock to pay any unpaid
balance of par if necessary to satisfy unpaid creditors of the
company.23 All creditors could take advantage of this rule, in-
cluding those who knew of the underpayment when they ad-
vanced credit.24 Does this rule give such creditors an
unwarranted windfall? In Dupont v. Ball,2s the Delaware
Supreme Court reasoned that it did not:
We are clearly of the opinion that mere knowledge that stock issued
as full paid and non-assessable was not in fact paid for, should not
preclude the creditor from enforcing the liability of the holder be-
cause the creditor may also know or have good reason to believe that
the holders of such stock would be legally liable for the debts of the
company to the extent of the par value of their stock. While the cred-
itor with knowledge could not have given credit upon faith that the
stock was paid for, he may very well have given credit upon the belief
that the holder of the stock would be liable to the creditors under the
19. Md at 708-09 (quoting In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 F.2d 357, 363
(2d Cir. 1914)).
20. Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 167-68, 153 N.W.2d
241, 246 (1967).
21. Id at 168, 153 N.W.2d at 246-47.
22. See DuPont v. Ball, 11 Del. Ch. 430, 444, 106 A. 39, 45 (1918).
23. Id, at 441, 106 A. at 43.
24. Id at 444, 106 A. at 45.
25. 11 Del. Ch. 430, 106 A. 39 (1918).
[Vol. 75:815
RELIANCE
statute whether he had paid for it or not.26
In other words, a liability which would not exist under Hospes
because a creditor aware of the discount had not relied, would
be decreed under Dupont because an informed creditor aware
of the law of Delaware would have relied.
Reliance, then, can be used to justify any established, well
known rule of law. Rules that burden, by imposing on some or
leaving others at risk, will cause actors to expect such burdens
or risks; conversely, rules that benefit, by rewarding some or
protecting others, will cause actors to expect such rewards or
protections. In short, all rules will sustain the reliance interest
they engender, whatever it may be.y
So what are we to make of Justice Mitchell's reliance argu-
ment in the Hospes case? In an attempt to find a sound basis
for the "trust fund" theory, he began with an unarticulated
premise that the basis existed, so that the corporation's credi-
tors could rely on it. 28 To invoke that premise, he uncon-
sciously weighed the worthiness of incompatible ambitions:
those of the creditors to get paid and those of the stockholders
to avoid personal liability.29 In short, he had to decide the case
on the legal merits as he saw them. He then announced that
the law is that which the "trust fund" cases had already estab-
26. I& at 444, 106 A. at 45.
27. The circularity of the reliance principle was recently illustrated in
Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990), in which the Supreme
Court upheld the jurisdiction of a California court over the defendant based
solely upon service upon his person while he was transient in California. The
Court was unanimous in its outcome but squabbled about its reasons. Justice
Brennan dave as one reason that "[t]he transient rule is consistent with rea-
sonable expectations and is entitled to a strong presumption that it comports
with due process. 'If I visit another State .... I knowingly assume some risk
that the State will exercise its power over my property or my person while
there."' Id- at 2124 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 218 (1977)). Justice Scalia, accurately but somewhat intemperately,
rejoined that the mental attitude Justice Brennan perceived was a result of a
rule of law, not the basis for it. Id. at 2118. In fact, Justice Brennan's logic
was more seriously flawed than Justice Scalia indicated. If Mr. Burnham had
gone on vacation to Paris instead of visiting his children in California, he
would have also taken the risk that France would exercise its power over his
property or person while there, but it would not follow that he had taken the
risk of being sued in French courts concerning American transactions. French
courts, like courts in other civil law countries, do not claim jurisdiction over
transients. Other contacts with France, such as residence, nationality, locus of
the tort or of performance of the contract, are necessary. See R. SCHLESINGER,
H. BAADE, M. DAMASKA, P. HERZOG, COMPARATIVE LAW 382-397 (5th ed. 1988).
28. Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 192-95, 50 N.W.
1117, 1119-20 (1892).
29. Id at 196-99, 50 N.W. at 1120-21.
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lished.30 His argument from reliance is really only a statement
of his belief that he is not eccentric - that the plaintiffs, had
they been judges, would have reached the same conclusion he
had reached and that therefore he would disappoint their rea-
sonable expectations unless he decided it that way.
Underlying these cases are policies concerning the alloca-
tion of risk. A court that ignores this point can easily make a
serious mistake. For instance, to assure the integrity of corpo-
rate capital, many states have constitutional provisions prohib-
iting corporations from issuing their stock in consideration of
the subscriber's unsecured promise to pay.3 ' In Stone v.
Hudgens,32 the court refused to enforce a subscriber's promise
to a bankrupt Oklahoma corporation. The obligation had been
carried on the company's books as an asset labelled "subscrip-
tions receivable."3 3 The court reasoned that any creditors' reli-
ance "was at most predicated upon a misapprehension of the
legal collectability of this listed receivable."' 4 Knowledgeable
creditors would know the transaction was illegal and void,
would not expect the stockholder's promise to be enforceable
and would not, therefore, rely on it. Other courts, aware that
the provision was for the protection of creditors, have furthered
its policy by refusing sanctuary to stock subscribers who have
violated its provisions.-
THE FALLACY IN A CONTEMPORARY SETTING -
SEARCH AND SEIZURE36
Since 1967, the Supreme Court has held that to invoke the
protection of the fourth amendment, "there is a twofold re-
quirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ,,37
30. Id at 197, 50 N.W. at 1121.
31. See ARIz. CONST. art. 14, § 6; UTAH CONST. art. 12, § 5; WAsH. CoNsT.
art. 12, § 6.
32. 129 F. Supp. 273 (W.D. Okla. 1955).
33. Id- at 274.
34. Id- at 276.
35. E.g., McCarty v. Langdeau, 337 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960)
("The constitutional provision was not intended as a shield for the stockholder
who has not paid for his stock.... It was designed for the protection of the
corporation and its creditors.") (quoting Joy v. Godchaux, 35 F.2d 649, 652 (8th
Cir. 1929)).
36. I am indebted to my colleague, Daniel Farber, for bringing this issue
to my attention.
37. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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This formulation begs the question, however, because United
States citizens' expectations are based, in part, on the fact that
they do not live in a police state. It also obscures the merits,
which require the balancing of American ideals of liberty with
a need for surveillance.
Just last term, the Supreme Court held that the warrant-
less arrest of one Olson, an overnight guest in an apartment he
was visiting, violated his fourth amendment rights.-3 Justice
White wrote: "Because [Olson's] expectation of privacy in the
Bergstrom home was rooted in 'understandings that are recog-
nized and permitted by society,' . . . it was legitimate, and
respondent can claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.13 9
Justice White did not discuss Olson's actual expectations. 40
Because Olson had driven a car for a hold-up and murder (a
fact he readily admitted immediately upon his arrest), he sus-
pected the police wanted him and might have obtained a war-
rant. The police had learned he was preparing to flee. They
surrounded the apartment and then gave telephone instruc-
tions to the host that Olson should come out. When he did not,
they entered, found him hiding in a closet, and arrested him.4'
The facts suggest that Olson had a justified and reasonable fear
of the police. He may not have been aware of the fine points of
search-and-seizure law and simply expected this police raid.
But, ifThe were sophisticated, he knew facts that made it likely
that the police could obtain a warrant and that the raid was
likely in any event.
It is fortunate that the Court did not consider Olson's
actual expectations, for that would have gutted the fourth
amendment. Justice White, considering "the understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society,"42 imposed his
value judgment that a guest in another's home should be free
from police intrusions in the absence of either permission or a
warrant. The discussion concerning Olson's expectations was
superfluous.
The previous term, the Court heard two cases challenging
regulations that subjected some classes of employees to drug
Though this formulation was in a concurring opinion, the Court has since
adopted it. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
38. Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1687 (1990).
39. Id at 1690.
40. See i- at 1686-90.
41. Id- at 1686-87.
42. Id- at 1690 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)).
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tests. In each case, the Court upheld the regulations, holding
that the tests did not violate the employees' fourth amendment
rights because their specific callings gave them "diminished ex-
pectations" of privacy.
In the first case, concerning customs employees, Justice
Kennedy observed:
[I]t is plain that certain forms of public employment may diminish
privacy expectations even with respect to such personal searches.
Employees of the United States Mint, for example, should expect to
be subject to certain routine personal searches when they leave the
workplace every day. Similarly, those who join our military or intelli-
gence services may not only be required to give what in other con-
texts might be viewed as extraordinary assurances of trustworthiness
and probity, but also may expect intrusive inquiries into their physical
fitness for those special positions....
We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the in-
terdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in the
line of duty likewise have a diminished expectation of privacy in re-
spect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test. Unlike most private
citizens or government employees in general, employees involved in
drug interdiction reasonably should expect effective inquiry into their
fitness and probity. Much the same is true of employees who are re-
quired to carry firearms. Because successful performance of their du-
ties depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity, these
employees cannot reasonably expect to keep from the Service per-
sonal information that bears directly on their fitness.... While rea-
sonable tests designed to elicit this information doubtless infringe
some privacy expectations, we do not believe these expectations out-
weigh the Government's compelling interests in safety and in the in-
tegrity of our borders.
4 3
In the second case concerning some railroad employees,
Justice Kennedy again discussed their diminished expectations
of privacy:
[The expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by
reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated perva-
sively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the
health and fitness of covered employees....
We do not suggest, of course, that the interest in bodily security
enjoyed by those employed in a regulated industry must always be
considered minimal. Here, however, the covered employees have long
been a principal focus of regulatory conern .... Though some of the
privacy interests implicated by the toxicological testing at issue rea-
sonably might be viewed as significant in other contexts, logic and his-
tory show that a diminished expectation of privacy attaches to
information relating to the physical condition of covered employees
and to this reasonable means of procuring such information. We con-
clude, therefore, that the testing procedures [here contemplated] pose




only limited threats to the justifiable expectations of privacy of cov-
ered employees.4
Certain it is that after these cases, the employees' expecta-
tions were diminished; but Justice Kennedy seems to be saying
that the expectations had always been diminished - that the
litigants foolishly hired attorneys to protect rights they had al-
ready knowingly relinquished. Unlike the facts in Olson, these
cases offer no indication of the employees' actual state of mind.
Justice Kennedy infers a diminished expectation from previous
intrusions. In other passages, however, he seems to be saying
that society would not be prepared to recognize as reasonable
any privacy expectations that would bar the intrusion.4 5 If Jus-
tice Kennedy is in fact arguing that the intrusions are reason-
able, his real argument is that other governmental concerns are
so important that the intrusions are not unreasonable within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. "Expectations" are not
relevant to this issue - it requires a balancing of burdens and
benefits.
In a generally overlooked footnote, Justice Blackmun,
writing for the Court in 1979, admitted that the expectations
test is wrong
[I]f the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide tele-
vision that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless en-
try, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual
expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects.
Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this Na-
tion's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously
monitoring his telephone conversations; a subjective expectation of
privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well.
In such circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations
had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could
play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection was. In determining whether a 'legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy' existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would
be proper.
4 6
Unfortunately, he did not follow this line of thought further.
Had he done so, he would have discovered that the "normative
inquiry" would not be about "expectations" but about the pri-
vacy that ought to be guaranteed by the fourth amendment so
that a particular intrusion is or is not "unreasonable" within
the meaning of the amendment.
44. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1418-19
(1989).
45. See icE at 1419-20.
46. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 74041 n.5 (1979).
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Indeed, in the customs and railway workers cases, Justice
Kennedy's primary inquiry was whether the government inter-
est justified departure from the usual warrant and probable
cause requirements embodied in the fourth amendment. His
discussion of expectations was a needless detour.
INDUCED RELIANCE - THE RELIANCE INTEREST
IN CONTRACTS
On the other hand, in some cases the actors' actual expec-
tations do color the situation. Contractual promises induce reli-
ance, and it does seem appropriate that the law vindicate such
expectations. But in their seminal article on reliance, Profes-
sors Fuller and Perdue are bothered by the same circularity al-
luded to above.47 It is true that breach of a promise
impoverishes the promisee by taking away a valuable asset re-
lied on by the promisee, but the authors could not accept this as
reason for the law to protect the reliance interest. They
thought this begged the question because the law made the
promise valuable by standing ready to enforce it. "'The expec-
tancy,' regarded as present value, is not the cause of legal inter-
vention but the consequence of it."4 They then concluded that
"courts have protected the expectation interest because they
have considered it wise to do so." 49 Because one can rely upon
the law to enforce promises, one can then afford to rely upon
the promises themselves, and this facilitates credit.5° The wis-
dom of establishing a credit economy produced this legal
development.
Although there is some truth in this view, it overstates the
role of law. Patterns of reliance occur in many institutions
even though there is no legal enforcement mechanism. Nations
enter treaties. Fellow legislators agree to support each other's
legislation. People make engagements to marry. Gamblers bet
on sporting events.51 Of course, the lack of legal remedies in
these situations can be explained. There is no super-sovereign
whose writ can run against a sovereign nation. In the other
47. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46
YALE L. J. 52, 59-60 (1936).
48. I&
49. Id at 60.
50. Id at 62.
51. The fact that many betting contracts are illegal may have some bear-
ing on their unenforceability, but even legal betting contracts are denied en-
forcement in Nevada. See Sea Air Support, Inc. v. Hermann, 96 Nev. 574, 575,
613 P.2d 413, 414 (1980) and cases cited therein.
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cases, judicial intervention is deemed inappropriate for a
number of reasons. But my point is that reliance nevertheless
occurs in those situations. It arises naturally in certain rela-
tionships in response to their institutional context; and the
presence or absence of legal remedies in that context is only
one matter to be considered. Very few promises are isolated
events. Many are part of a continuing relationship or a web of
relationships. Promises are kept to preserve such relationships
and to preserve a reputation which will facilitate other valuable
relationships. This need to sustain relationships makes
promises reliable and hence valuable. The prospect of a legal
remedy is often insufficient. For example, bargainers who fore-
see that they will have to sue to obtain promised benefits are
likely to reject the deal at the outset.
Moreover, in many situations, actors have, or should have,
protected themselves against disappointment. As Thurman Ar-
nold observed, attitudes toward undertakings have changed
over the years.52 At one time, one who broke a promise was
considered akin to a thief. Today, it is recognized that each
promisee has taken a risk, one which should be anticipated and
provided for. Consequently, some blame falls on the promisee
who takes an improvident risk.53 In this perspective, complete
reliance on others' undertakings is improvident. Persons
should recognize that their expectations will sometimes be dis-
appointed. Prudent reliers will recognize risks and take pre-
cautions. Of course, Arnold was thinking primarily of the risk
of insolvency, not duplicity; but both risks are real and the law
gives little effective protection against either one, given the ex-
pense of seeking compensatory relief. Perhaps, then, the avail-
ability of a legal remedy for breach of contract is relevant
primarily to the amount of risk actors must anticipate and the
extent to which they ought to attempt to minimize that risk by
hedging, diversifying and taking other precautions.
CONCLUSION
Logical connections do not parallel functional ones. An in-
stitution is a galaxy of rules, customs, habits, practices, under-
standings and expectations. These elements come together,
mutually supporting one another. It is not logical, therefore, to
attempt to fashion the rules governing an institution from the
52. T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALisM 231-32 (1937).
53. Id Arnold suggested that this change of attitude explains why impris-
onment for debt was once considered appropriate but no longer is.
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expectations the institution engenders, any more than it is logi-
cal to fashion the expectations from the governing rules. (As
the above examples of treaties, social engagements and political
promises indicate, the mere fact that we deem it desirable that
many promises induce reliance does not mean that all such
promises should be legally enforceable.) And asking "what ex-
pectations do we wish to foster?" is no more enlightening than
asking "what rules to we want to enact?" The judge who is
seeking to formulate rules according to some principle of desir-
ability - be it "justice" or some other value - will envision
participants in the regulated activity with a set of values like
those of the judge and will act accordingly. Consequently,
when judges seek to vindicate a perceived reliance interest,
they are usually seeking to further their own values. If they
also tell us why the reliers' values are appropriate and why the
reliance, therefore, is justified, their arguments from reliance
are merely a needless detour. They ultimately tell us why they
believe their edict is a just one. If they refer to reliance and
stop at that, however, they have invoked a principle that does
not point to only one conclusion, and they have failed to articu-
late the reason for their action.
[Vol. 75:815
